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Marquette University
Abstract. Discussions about theological realism within analytic philosophy of 
religion, and the larger conversation between analytic and continental styles in 
philosophy of religion have generated relatively little interest among Catholic 
philosophers and theologians; conversely, the work of major figures in recent 
Catholic theology seems to evoke little interest from analytic philosophers of 
religion. using the 1998 papal encyclical on faith and reason, Fides et ratio, as 
a major point of reference, this essay offers a preliminary account of the bases 
for such seeming mutual indifference and offers some suggestions for future 
dialogue.
In this essay, I will be offering three points of reference from which to 
locate current philosophical discussions of theological realism with 
respect to another set of substantive discussions about the relation 
between philosophy and theology that have been taking place since 
the middle of the twentieth century. The goal for doing so is to raise 
the larger question of how philosophers and theologians representing 
a  range of divergent intellectual traditions can constructively engage 
one another in mutual conversation. my main focus will be on the 
discourse and idioms regarding faith, reason, and religion that have been 
characteristically used by most Catholic philosophers and theologians 
since at least the late nineteenth century establishment of Thomism as 
paradigmatic for their inquiry. one of my specific purposes here is to 
provide an initial account of why these modes of Catholic philosophical 
and theological inquiry have been, for the most part, more observers 
(and often not particularly attentive ones) rather than participants in 
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efforts by analytic and continental philosophers of religion to enter into 
productive conversation with one another as well as in their concomitant 
efforts to engage in conversation with theologians. my hope is that the 
points offered here will indicate that attention to these markers may help 
to delimit key parts of the larger conceptual and historical territories 
on which philosophy and theology have engaged – and in some cases 
failed to engage  – one another in ‘high modernity’ and its aftermath. 
It will be my suggestion that taking account of the orientations these 
markers provide upon these Catholic conversations can help to construct 
pathways leading to an  enlarged and, one hopes, more productive 
encounter between philosophy and theology.
The first marker is Pope John Paul II’s encyclical, Fides et ratio, ‘on 
the relationship between Faith and reason’. I  consider it a  fortuitous 
circumstance that this conference on ‘Philosophical Perspectives on 
Theological realism’ is taking place just a few days prior to the fifteenth 
anniversary of the publication of this document on September 14, 1998. 
Fides et ratio provides an  important basis from which those who, like 
myself, locate their work within the ambit of the long traditions of 
roman Catholic philosophical and theological inquiry may enter into 
a renewed and perhaps even reconfigured engagement with fundamental 
questions about the multi-layered set of conceptual, methodological, 
and historical relations between the two disciplines. As I will propose 
in more detail later, not the least of the reasons for the significance of 
Fides et ratio as a marker for orienting engagements between philosophy 
and theology is that it takes further steps along the road that Gerald 
mcCool had described, almost a decade earlier, as leading from ‘unity 
to pluralism’ in the internal evolution of the Thomism that had become, 
by the late nineteenth century, the officially sanctioned benchmark for 
roman Catholic philosophical and theological inquiry.1 In particular, 
though this document still affirms pride of place to philosophical 
reflection articulated in continuity with Aquinas’s modes of inquiry and 
thinking, it offers ‘room at the table’ for other – though not all – modes 
of philosophical thinking.2 How much room it allows, and for whom, 
1 Gerald A. mcCool, SJ, From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism 
(New York: Fordham university Press, 1989).
2 Fides et ratio, § 59, § 74. The former section briefly mentions and commends the 
views of a  number of the philosophers who are then identified by name in the latter 
section; see also § 76.
163buIlDING brIDGeS AND CroSSING bouNDArIeS
remain open questions that have a  major bearing how to chart the 
scope and direction of future conversations between philosophers and 
theologians that more directly involve modes of discourse and inquiry 
rooted in these Catholic intellectual traditions.
The second marker is, I  suspect, considerably less widely known, 
though it does bear directly on the conversation between analytic and 
continental modes of doing philosophy of religion. It comes from a panel 
discussion that took place at the 1993 Annual meeting of the American 
Academy of religion, the largest academic society in the english-
speaking world for the multi-segmented field of religious studies. This 
panel was convened to explore the differences between ‘philosophy of 
religion’ as it is practiced and presented by two groups of scholars with 
different primary venues of academic dissemination of their work, one 
at the annual meetings of the American Academy of religion, the other 
at the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association. 
The four panel presentations from that session, supplemented by four 
invited contributions, were subsequently published in a concise volume, 
still available from oxford university Press, titled God, Philosophy, and 
Academic Culture.3 In addition to trying to characterize from a variety 
of conceptual grids the differences between these two approaches to 
philosophy of religion – a task complicated by the fact that there are levels 
of overlap between the two groups – the participants in the discussion 
also paid some attention to historical and socio-cultural factors in each 
group that play a role in shaping different styles of argumentation, topics 
considered of central importance, and views about the function of this 
field of philosophical inquiry both in the academy and in the wider 
dynamics of culture.
While there are number of elements in these essays that would be 
quite useful to explore, there are at least two that I consider particularly 
significant for my purposes in this essay: the first is that even though the 
discussants agree that one major difference roughly follows the ‘analytic/
continental’ fault line, that is not the only difference of consequence 
they identify.4 The second is that some of those other differences seem 
to have their source in matters that are not extensively discussed in the 
3 ed. William J. Wainwright (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996).
4 Philip Quinn’s essay, ‘The Cultural Anthropology of Philosophy of religion’, pp. 47-
57 in God, Philosophy, and Academic Culture, imaginatively cast as a description of the 
‘tribal’ practices of each group of philosophers, is especially instructive on this point.
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essays, the most important of which may very well be what I will call the 
unarticulated theological ‘registers’ that give to the work done on each 
side of the fault line a distinctive ‘tonality’ with respect to its possibilities 
for engaging various forms of Christian theological discourse. These 
tonalities, moreover, are themselves indicative of differences with respect 
to how participants in each group understand and engage the ‘life-
worlds’ of religious believers and their communities – and, increasingly 
important in ‘a secular age’, how they might engage the ‘life worlds’ of 
non-believers and the religiously indifferent.5 As I will note in more detail 
latter, there is an important formal similarity here to how I will analyze 
the import of Fides et ratio in that attention needs to be paid to what that 
document does not fully articulate, particularly with respect to engaging 
analytic philosophy of religion; in this case, the important unarticulated 
presuppositions of the document bear upon the substance and grammar 
of its own philosophical and theological anthropology, as well as what 
it takes to be the operative counterparts of such anthropology in its 
enlarged range of philosophical interlocutors.
The third marker is intended to provide a  sense of the ‘place from 
which’ Fides et ratio has moved prior Catholic philosophical and 
theological discourse to the opening it has now provided for engaging 
a wider range of philosophical conversation partners. The marker I offer 
here is biographical inasmuch as the philosophical and theological 
education I received through the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, as 
well as my subsequent experience as a philosopher who has been part 
of a  theology faculty for close to four decades, represents in concrete 
terms key points of the arc that plots the intellectual trajectory taken 
in Fides et ratio from polemic to dialogue. This journey starts from 
a Thomistic-scholastic mode of discourse that was energetically renewed 
in the nineteenth century and that could be simultaneously triumphalist 
and defensive it its idiom and moves to a late twentieth century readiness 
to engage constructively with at least some of the other philosophical 
idioms it had once looked upon with deep suspicion.
my starting point for locating this point of reference is a remark that 
a  fellow Jesuit, a  scientist some twenty years my senior, made to me 
during the spring of 1971 before I started doctoral studies in philosophy 
5 The distinction I am making here is between those who have, in one way or another, 
opted not to believe and those for whom religious belief does not enter into their ‘social 
imaginary’.
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at the university of Texas. From a previous conversation he was aware 
that one reason for my decision to seek an advanced degree in philosophy 
was a belief that, in the long run, it might be more useful than a degree in 
theology for helping to address the issues in theological ethics that then 
seemed to be most central.6 He now wanted to know why I thought that 
the program in philosophy at Texas was suitable for what I was hoping 
to do in the future; I said to him that it had a reputation for being one 
of the few philosophy departments in the united States that seemed to 
be intentionally seeking to foster productive exchange between analytic 
and continental ways of doing philosophy, and that being part of that 
kind of exchange might be instructive for my future purposes. Part of his 
response to me was something to the effect that I should be careful not 
to become too engaged with that ‘analytic stuff ’ – a remark uttered with 
a tone of concern that carried an implication that not too far down the 
analytic road lay the slippery slope going from scepticism to unbelief. 
His response was not totally a  surprise to me, since it resonated with 
the adversarial tonality with which the forms of Thomist-scholastic 
philosophy taught in Catholic seminaries and universities since at 
least the late nineteenth century had treated all the philosophy it took 
to issue from Descartes’ fatal mistake of turning toward the cogito. In 
consequence, they all were thought eventually to lead to one or another 
of the ‘isms’ – subjectivism, materialism, relativism, idealism, pantheism, 
and ultimately atheism – that oppose the integral truth about humanity, 
6 There was vigorous discussion at the time over the question of the distinctiveness 
of Christian ethics, particularly with respect to philosophical ethics, a  debate well 
summarized in James Gustafson’s 1975 book, Can Ethics Be Christian? (Chicago: 
university of Chicago Press, 1975). There are resonances between that discussion and 
the revival of discussion about the possibility and the nature of ‘Christian philosophy’, 
for which one marker is the founding of the Society of Christian Philosophers in 1978. 
It is of note that this organization does not endorse any particular understanding 
of ‘Christian philosophy’, in that its membership ‘is open to anyone interested in 
philosophy who considers himself or herself a Christian. membership is not restricted 
to any particular “school” of philosophy or to any branch of Christianity, nor to 
professional philosophers.’ (<http://www.societyofchristianphilosophers.com>, accessed 
July 24, 2013). An  alternative set of perspectives on Christian philosophy, that places 
it in the context of earlier discussions of the issue among (mostly) european Catholic 
philosophers and theologians, can be found in The Question of Christian Philosophy 
Today, ed. Francis J. Ambrosio (New York: Fordham university Press, 1999). Key issues 
in all these discussions, in my judgment, are embedded in the larger phenomena of 
secularity that are described and analyzed in Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (Cambridge: 
Harvard university Press, 2007).
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the cosmos, and God that reason, guided by the light of faith, is capable 
of discerning.
Though the concerns of my elder Jesuit colleague might have been 
later alleviated by the fact that in the course of doctoral studies my work 
did not take an  ‘analytic turn’  – or at least not a  full one  – that work 
did go in a direction that, by the standards of the adversarial Thomisms 
of the mid-twentieth century was undoubtedly worse: it turned in the 
direction of Immanuel Kant. It would not directly serve the purpose of 
this essay to rehearse in detail the intriguing history of the more than 
two centuries of Catholic engagement with Kant and his intellectual 
heritage.7 What is likely to be important, however, for our purposes, is 
an awareness that what I have argued for elsewhere as possibilities for 
a far less adversarial Catholic engagement with Kant8 have emerged as 
at least a  partial consequence of a  greatly enriched understanding of 
the historical and cultural contexts out of which such a confrontational 
dynamic towards Kant developed as part of a larger Catholic response 
of resistance in various forms and at various levels, to ‘modernity’ and 
‘enlightenment’.9 Attention to such historical and cultural contexts can be 
helpful for moving the mode of conversation from polemic to dialogue.
let me now offer a  more detailed look at these markers. I  will 
concentrate on the first two, since the biographical one is, to a  large 
degree, embedded within the dynamics at work in each of them. As 
already noted, the focus will be upon matters that, even though they 
are of importance in providing conditions for productive conversation 
7 For a  wide-ranging account of this engagement see the essays in Kant und der 
Katholizismus: Stationen einer wechselhaften Geschichte, ed. Norbert Fischer (Freiburg: 
Verlag Herder, 2005).
8 See Philip J. rossi, ‘reading Kant from a  Catholic Horizon: ethics and the 
Anthropology of Grace’, Theological Studies, 71 (2010), 79-100; ‘Finite Freedom, 
Fractured and Fragile: Kant’s Anthropology as resource for a  Postmodern Theology 
of Grace’, Philosophie et théologie: Festschrift Emilio Brito, SJ, bibliotheca ephemeridum 
Theologicarum lovaniensium, 206, ed. Éric Gaziaux (leuven: Peeters Press, 2007), 
pp. 47-60; ‘reading Kant through Theological Spectacles’, Kant and the New Philosophy 
of Religion, ed. Chris l. Firestone and Stephen r. Palmquist (bloomington: Indiana 
university Press, 2006), pp. 107-123; ‘Die bedeutung der Philosophie Immanuel Kants 
für die gegenwärtige katholische Theologie in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika’, in 
Fischer, Kant und der Katholizismus, pp. 441-460.
9 A  growing body of historical scholarship examining ‘Catholic enlightenment’ is 
showing that Catholic engagement with various currents of enlightenment thought and 
culture was by no means uniformly one of resistance. See A Companion to the Catholic 
Enlightenment in Europe, ed. ulrich l. lehner and michael Printy (leiden: brill, 2010).
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across these different idioms, are given, at best, only cursory attention in 
the two texts that I have referenced.
With respect to Fides et ratio, the most obvious matter of importance 
given little attention is the very heritage and practice of the forms of 
‘analytic philosophy’ that by the mid-twentieth century had became 
a powerful idiom for philosophical discussion in the english speaking 
world and were starting to gain world-wide intellectual influence.10 
At one level, the absence of extensive engagement is not surprising, 
given that the larger intellectual trajectory out of which this document 
emerged only occasionally engaged that idiom and, when it did so, 
was more often than not in a  polemical mode.11 Fides et ratio moves 
in general consonance with the trajectory set out in the nineteenth-
century revival of Thomism that resulted in an official approbation, in 
leo XIII’s encyclical, Aeterni patris (1879), of the work of Aquinas as 
a  touchstone for the mutual engagement of philosophy and theology 
and that then launched an  energetic outpouring of historical, textual, 
systematic, and polemical studies of Thomas and Thomism that has 
continued for more than a century.12 Armed with the internal assurance 
of being philosophia perennis, there was little urgency for much of neo-
Thomism to engage philosophical idioms other than its own, even as 
it focused on fierce internal disputes about which of its own schools of 
interpretation could lay the strongest claim to represent the thought of 
Thomas Aquinas authentically.13 With respect to analytic philosophy 
in particular, moreover, it was perceived as a philosophical idiom that, 
inasmuch as it worked along epistemic and metaphysical trajectories that 
10 one allusion can be found in § 84 in which there is mention of ‘analysis of language’.
11 Perhaps most notably in a bbC radio debate from 1948 on the existence of God that 
took place between Frederick C. Copleston, SJ and bertrand russell.
12 Important elements of this are laid out by Gerald A. mcCool, Catholic Theology in 
the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1977). 
A particularly notable irony is that the historical work that was given major impetus by 
this official approbation of Thomas eventually showed considerable difference between 
Thomas’s own teaching and the views put forth in his name by many of the important 
nineteenth century proponents of the Thomistic revival.
13 An important exception to this was the work of the belgian Jesuit, Joseph maréchal, 
whose five volume major work, Le point de départ de la métaphysique: leçons sur le 
développement historique et théorique du problème de la connaissance, bruxelles: l’Édition 
universelle (Paris: Desclée, De brouwer, 1944-1949), intentionally engaged the work of 
Kant in a  constructive manner and resulted in the distinctive style of ‘transcendental 
Thomism’, which had a significant impact on mid-twentieth century Catholic theology, 
most notably in the work of Karl rahner, SJ.
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diverged considerably from Thomistic realism, offered little prospect 
for constructive engagement, let alone convergence. It was seen as the 
heir of an empirical tradition that understood the human person and its 
relation to the world in ways, such as Hume’s radical scepticism about the 
continuity of personal identity or the anthropological presuppositions 
about human motivation taken to be characteristic of utilitarianism, that 
provided little space for an openness of the human spirit to the reality of 
a transcendent God.
As mcCool’s work on the history of neo-Thomism indicates, by the mid-
twentieth century such a dynamic of insularity was no longer sustainable; 
Fides et ratio may thus be considered as representing a  new dynamic 
that makes dialogue as well as polemic a  legitimate form for Catholic 
philosophy and theology to engage other forms of philosophical inquiry 
and discourse. The encyclical envisions that the range of conceptual 
idioms and philosophical grammars with which Catholic philosophers 
and theologians may now engage in constructive conversation now 
stretches beyond the ambit of the varieties of Thomism that held almost 
exclusive primacy as interlocutors until the last third of the twentieth 
century. It opens new lines for discussion of the relationships between 
philosophy and theology that engage, in a  positive spirit, a  range of 
philosophical idioms and methods considerably wider than had usually 
been allowed by prior parameters for such conversation – parameters that 
too often showed more alacrity for identifying adversaries to be refuted 
than for providing conditions for mutually respectful and enlightening 
exchanges over both commonalities and genuinely deep differences. Yet, 
neither analytic philosophy nor any of its major expositors is explicitly 
included as one of these new interlocutors, let alone as a  potentially 
significant one.14
Analytic philosophy’s perceived difference from – and even opposition 
to – the epistemic and metaphysical trajectories in consonance with the 
expanded Thomistic horizon that the encyclical affirms seems to be 
the central factor in its lack of engagement with the extensive work in 
philosophy of religion (or, alternately, philosophical theology) that has 
been done in the analytic mode since the last quarter of the twentieth 
14 With the exception of John Henry Newman (§ 74), no Anglophone philosopher 
or theologian is mentioned by name in the encyclical. A  further indication that little 
attention is given to the traditions of english language philosophy is that pragmatism 
is dismissed as ‘an attitude of mind, which in making its choices, precludes theoretical 
considerations or judgments based on ethical principles’ (§ 89).
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century. Yet I think there is a significant additional factor that contributes 
to this lack of engagement, namely, what was mentioned above as the 
unarticulated theological ‘registers’ in which that work has often been 
done. I  think it is at least arguable that, with the notable exception of 
the attention paid to Aquinas and other prominent medieval thinkers, 
particularly with respect to the doctrine of God, as well as to Christology, 
the ‘theological register’ in which much of this work is set has been keyed 
to concerns that have more typically preoccupied various streams of 
Christian theology issuing from the reformation – most notably those 
in a  Calvinist/reformed mode  – rather than Catholic theology. I  also 
think that a  case might be made for a  connection between these two 
factors, inasmuch as one long standing line of Catholic apologetic with 
respect to the reformation and its theological inheritance has been to 
trace the source of its theological errors back to the epistemological 
and metaphysical principles and presuppositions of late medieval 
nominalism, of which the traditions of british empiricism are taken to 
be the heir.15
A case in point is that, while a number of Catholics (a notable example 
would be the late Philip Quinn) have been prominent participants 
from the outset in the revival of analytic philosophy of religion and 
philosophical theology, the impact of that revival upon Catholic theology 
seems to have been marginal. There are, it must be noted, regional 
differences here: e.g. Catholic philosophers and theologians working in 
the academic context of the uK have been proportionately more likely 
to be familiar with and work within the idioms of analytic philosophy 
(e.g., elizabeth Anscombe, John Haldane, Gerard Hughes, Fergus 
Ker, Janice martin Soskice, Denys Turner) than their counterparts in 
the uS. one index of this is that a  perusal of the programs from the 
most recent meetings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 
gives little indication that, save in a  few highly specialized areas, the 
guild of Catholic theologians in the united States sees any urgency for 
theological engagement either with the general methods of analytic 
philosophy or the range of work produced by analytic philosophers of 
religion.16 Similarly, in the meetings and publications of the American 
15 A version of this argument appears in brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: 
How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 
2012).
16 There is an  instructive set of essays, Hermes and Athena: Biblical Exegesis and 
Philosophical Theology, ed. eleanore Stump and Thomas P. Flint (Notre Dame: university 
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Catholic Philosophical Association, though there has recently been more 
engagement with the methods and representative key works of analytic 
philosophy and the list of recent presidents includes some notable 
analytic philosophers (linda Zagzebski (1997) and eleanore Stump 
(2000)), the predominant philosophical idiom represented in its work 
remains the ramified discourse of a Thomism expanded and enriched 
primarily by engagement with a variety of historical and contemporary 
idioms of continental philosophy and to a much lesser degree with the 
idioms of analytic philosophy.
Conversely, engagement with the key works of major Catholic 
twentieth century theologians such as Delubac, rahner, Von balthasar, 
or lonergan, has rarely been a prominent focus of attention for the work 
of analytic philosophers of religion. I  don’t think that the reason for 
this at best oblique intersection with Catholic theology on either side 
lies principally in the fact that analytic philosophical methods have not 
found their way into the conceptual/linguistic ‘toolbox’ of most Catholic 
theologians, nor that these Catholic theologians employ theological 
grammars resistant to analytic parsing. I  think that what has been, so 
far, only occasional peripheral engagement has had at least as much to 
do with the fact that the prominent sets of issues that have been at stake 
in analytic discussions – for instance, in addition to questions about the 
existence and attributes of god, there are those that cluster around the 
dynamics of sin, grace, redemption as these intersect with the epistemic 
and volitional structure and dynamics of the human condition (a major 
concern of the work of Alvin Plantinga) – have been set in a register more 
resonant with the theological agendas and theological anthropologies 
of the reformation than with some of the important pre- or post-
reformation Catholic alternatives. Another set of issues, clustering 
around topics such as the divine attributes, arguments for God’s existence, 
aspects of Christology, and theodicy, do intersect more directly with 
discussions that have been prominent loci in Catholic philosophical and 
theological discourse. These issues are pertinent as elements of what is 
termed ‘fundamental theology’, which in recent eras of Catholic theology 
has served as a locus of transition from philosophy to theology in which 
of Notre Dame Press, 1993), that illustrate some of the methodological and interpretative 
challenges that arose from an  effort to engage biblical scholars (most of whom work 
from a Catholic theological context) with analytic philosophers of religion. Part of the 
challenge and the irony of these exchanges is that the majority of participants consider 
themselves Christian believers.
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one concern has been the articulation of apologetic arguments.17 It is 
important, however, to note that there are exceptions in which there has 
been more engagement with analytic idioms, among the most notable 
being the work of David burrell, who has been an important Catholic 
interlocutor on issues such as divine agency and divine freedom.18
Paying attention to what I  have termed the theological registers 
that are implicit in the work of analytic philosophers of religion – and 
conversely to the implicit (as well as the explicit) philosophical registers 
in the work of Catholic theologians – offers, I believe, an initial strategy 
for surveying useful paths along which to link the intellectual territory 
delimited by the marker that is (textually) represented by Fides et ratio 
and that delimited by the marker represented by the discussions in 
God, Philosophy, and Academic Culture. At the same time, however, it is 
quite important to be attentive to some other families of philosophical 
idioms – or, to return to a  spatial image, to some other philosophical 
territories – that so far have tended to stand in inchoate, tentative and/
or uneasy relationships with both the idioms of analytic philosophy and 
the idioms of Catholic philosophy and theology delimited in Fides et 
ratio. Two of the other idioms clearly significant in this regard can be 
found, first, in the discourses of so-called post modernity, particularly 
with respect to their attentiveness to the contingency and finitude of 
the human condition, and, second, in the discourses of both reflective 
and practical engagement with the religious and cultural plurality that is 
deeply embedded in the human condition.
I would thus like to conclude by offering some brief considerations 
about each of these and their importance for shaping future 
conversations between philosophy and theology. my proposal here is 
that one important dimension of their significance lies in the extent to 
which they are allowed to function as disruptive idioms – or, perhaps 
more modestly, as idioms of surprise and de-centring – that require both 
analytic philosophy of religion and Catholic philosophy and theology 
17 An additional factor for the absence of full engagement seems to lie in the fact that 
there has been a distinctive institutional Catholic academic culture of higher education 
in the united States that has provided a context both for the maintenance of distinctive 
styles of Catholic philosophy and for measured engagement with the styles characteristic 
of the ‘secular academy’.
18 See, for instance, Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame: university 
of Notre Dame Press, 1993); Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, 
Aquinas (Notre Dame: university of Notre Dame Press, 1992).
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to reexamine the adequacy of our own settled ways of speaking – or not 
speaking – of the divine and how we stand in our humanity in relation 
to the divine.
As already noted, Fides et ratio gives, at best, scant attention to the 
idioms of analytic philosophy but it does pay greater notice, though 
little of it positive, to modulations of the philosophical idioms that have 
emerged as an explicit engagement with the aftermath of modernity.19 
It also takes note, in generally more positive fashion, of the importance 
of engaging the philosophical dimensions that are operative, both as 
implicit and as reflectively articulated, in human cultural and religious 
diversity.20 Yet the direction of its discussion of all of these idioms suggests 
that whatever positive value they have to bring to an engagement with 
the authoritative tradition(s) of Catholic philosophy and theology is to 
be measured by its consonance with that which the tradition already has 
fully and adequately in its possession. In this regard, even though Fides 
et ratio does not speak in the highly adversarial tonality in which neo-
Thomism was often expressed, the scope of the plurality it allows and, 
in my view, the scope of what it sees as possible for Catholic philosophy 
and theology to learn from a  robust engagement with plurality  – and 
its potential for surprise or even disruption  – remains circumscribed 
and hedged with great caution. With particular reference to issues of 
theological realism, moreover, it is important to note that the encyclical’s 
affirmation of theological realism uses ‘metaphysics’ as a key term within 
its own idiom to express that caution and that it links a  still strongly 
Thomist understanding of metaphysics to the possibility of affirming 
the transcendent reality that Christians name God.21 Put in somewhat 
different terms, the encyclical does not seek to articulate a  defence of 
theological realism, since it takes such realism simply as a given for the 
theological enterprise.
Yet there is a way in which Fides et ratio acknowledges (ironically in 
my judgment) the disruptive value of the ‘post-modern’: This is in the 
extent that these idioms are, often by intent, in deconstructive dissonance 
to both the tonality and the substance of the intellectual traditions of the 
19 §§ 46-47, 55-56, 61, 81, 84, 90-91 contain allusions and references to some of the 
elements that characterize a  number of the forms of ‘post-modern’ philosophy. See 
Philip J. rossi, SJ, ‘After Fides et Ratio: New models for a New millennium’, Philosophy & 
Theology, 12 (2000), 419-431.
20 §§ 70-72, 95.
21 §§ 83-85.
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modernity that formed the context for their emergence.22 In this regard, the 
encyclical is ready to enlist this dissonance as an ally for its own criticism 
of modernity.23 At the same time, it resists the force of such dissonance 
as it might apply to its own locutions and pays little heed to the high 
demands this idiom makes for listening with an ear trained to discern 
the interstices and the interruptions that arise within its own locutions 
from silence, the unsaid, and the absence of the said. In consequence, 
Fides et ratio all too readily hears in the idioms of postmodernity only 
the monotone bleakness of nihilism or the cacophonies of relativisms. To 
that extent they can be all too readily dismissed as the latest – and among 
the least attractive – variants of high modernity; and in their most ironic 
forms they could be argued to display an  ‘exclusive anti-humanism’ 
that stands as the shadow side of what Charles Taylor has described as 
modernity’s ‘exclusive humanism’.
Along with Fides et ratio, analytic philosophy of religion has often 
had notable reservations about the idioms of post-modernity and 
(perhaps to lesser degree) the idioms of religious and cultural plurality – 
though from conceptual and cultural bases that only partially overlap 
those operative in the judgments the encyclical makes. In some of these 
reservations there is, for instance, an engagement with issues articulated 
in terms of ‘metaphysics’, but there are significant differences from the 
encyclical in the operative construal of that term and its appropriate 
function in both philosophical and theological discourse.24 As the essays 
in God, Philosophy, and Academic Culture almost all note these idioms of 
post-modernity and plurality have been far more frequently heard among 
those whose stand on the ‘continental’ side of the fault line dividing the 
discourses of philosophy of religion in Anglophone academic culture. In 
the two decades that have passed since the AAr session that engaged the 
differences between the two styles of philosophy of religion there seems 
22 In this, the encyclical offers an instance of one of the alliances that Charles Taylor 
sees as characteristic of ‘the three, perhaps ultimately, four-cornered battle’ in modern 
culture, in this case an  alliance in which ‘neo-Nietzscheans and acknowledgers of 
transcendence are together in their absence of surprise at the continued disappointments 
of secular humanism ... ’ (‘A  Catholic modernity?’, Dilemmas and Connections 
(Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 2011), p. 180).
23 § 91.
24 Some of these particular differences have their sources, not surprisingly, in the 
extent to which one views the various modern criticisms of ‘metaphysics’ as successful 
or not.
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to have been some reorientations on both sides that have made possible 
more passages back and forth from different places along some of the 
major and minor fault lines.25 The essays identify a number of intellectual 
and cultural factors that, particularly in retrospect, seem to have started 
to have an impact in this regard.26 At the risk of oversimplification, let 
me suggest that what links a number of these factors is that, in a variety 
of ways, they exhibit the pressure of an insistent plurality that resists the 
deep and equally persistent human drive to closure that Susan Neiman 
has perceptively articulated in her treatment of ‘sufficient reason’.27 Put 
in more historical terms, the plurality that has become an  insistently 
present dynamic in our global, interdependent, multi-cultural and 
multi-religious world has entered into challenging and potentially 
deeply creative play with the human drive to make comprehensive sense 
of things that Kant gestured toward in identifying it as human reason’s 
‘natural tendency (Naturanlage) to metaphysics’.28
my reference to Kant is offered to suggest that, in seeking to engage 
the discourses of post-modernity and of religious and cultural plurality, 
both the long predominant idioms of Catholic philosophy and theology 
and many of the idioms of analytic philosophy of religion are posed 
with a range of challenges to the nature and the status of the systemic 
presuppositions on which they each operate. To put this challenge in 
Kantian terms, the challenge is the extent to which those presuppositions 
are more appropriately characterized and function as ‘constitutive’ or as 
‘regulative’. Put in a post modern idiom, the challenge is the extent to 
which dissonance, interruption, and fragmentation are to be recognized 
as bearing at least equal significance in efforts to make sense of the cosmos 
and of ourselves as are the harmony, continuity, and unity that are markers 
of systemic thought. Put in the idiom of religious and cultural plurality, 
the challenge is the extent to which the living traditions of reflective 
discourse and practice from Asia, the global South, and indigenous 
25 Interest in Kierkegaard from both sides seems to be one marker of this; see C. 
Stephen evans, ‘on Taking God Seriously: Philosophy of religion in the APA and the 
AAr’, in God, Philosophy, and Academic Culture, p. 69.
26 For on overview that attends to a number of these developments, see William Wood, 
‘on the New Analytic Theology: or the road less Travelled’, Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion, 77 (2009), 941-960.
27 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An  Alternative History of Philosophy 
(Princeton: Princeton university Press, 2002), pp. 314-328.
28 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics § 60, AA 4: 362-365.
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cultures now require those of us whose intellectual traditions have 
made us accustomed to heed, first and foremost, imperatives of systemic 
(and often monologic) unity, now need to attend far more carefully to 
plurality and otherness on its own terms as emergent from these life 
worlds. I would also like to suggest that such attention to interreligious 
and cross cultural plurality and otherness might make possible more 
productive and respectful attention to the historical plurality within our 
own traditions of philosophical and theological discourse as they have 
emerged (and continue to emerge) from the life worlds of the Christian 
east as well as the Christian West.29
I have tried to indicate in these concluding considerations that there 
is much value for our philosophical and theological enterprises if we take 
seriously the interruptive challenge that the idioms of postmodernity 
and of religious and cultural plurality pose to the systemic character of 
our enterprises; i.e., that aspect of our disciplines in which we labour to 
construct coherent and comprehensive patterns of meaning into which 
to fit all the different elements of our inquiry – and the life worlds that 
give rise to the inquiry in the first place. This is a  challenge to which 
I believe we will have to pay attention once we attach significant weight – 
as I  think we should  – to post-modern idioms that express the deep 
fractures that run all the way down the contexts from which we humans 
seek to exact meaning, and to idioms of interreligious and intercultural 
engagement that articulate difference and otherness as constitutive in 
our efforts to shape meaning.
These idioms remind us how deeply fracture, difference, and 
otherness run down through ourselves as finite seekers of such meaning. 
We need to consider, as philosophers and theologians, the extent to 
which these fractures have methodological consequences upon the 
way we conceive of and conduct our inquiries precisely as systemic 
enterprises. If we do so, we may then be in a position to articulate, in 
a way appropriate to what Charles Taylor has described as the ‘fractured 
horizons’ of modernity and its aftermath, a  ‘methodological modesty’ 
(and perhaps also a  ‘metaphysical modesty’) about what the systemic 
character of our enterprises may yield as finally ordered comprehensiveness 
on behalf of human efforts to render the world – and ourselves as part 
of that world  – intelligible. Such ‘methodological modesty’, moreover, 
29 This suggests that Christian ecumenism and interreligious engagement share 
a fundamental challenge with respect to religious otherness.
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may provide an important context from which we could then properly 
grapple with the questions about whether and how we, and the world of 
which we are a part, can stand as it is and move forward toward what 
it ought to be only by our standing in relation to a transcendent other 
that (freely) constitutes us in the finite otherness and the differences of 
the radical contingency of dependence to which Christian discourse has 
given the name ‘Creation’.
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